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LABOR LAW
THE PRESENT CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS OF THE LAW OF
PICKETING
Picketing has recently been considered in a new light by the United
States Supreme Court, with the result that the law in this regard has
been altered considerably. On February IO, 1941 the highest court
of the nation handed down two decisions which changed the law of pick-
eting to a great extent. In Milk Wagon Drivers Union, Etc. v. Mea-
dowmoor Dairies,1 the court, speaking through Mr. Justice Frankfurter
enjoined a labor union and its members from peacefully picketing and
influencing customers not to buy from the independently owned trade
outlets of a dairy. The union was opposed to the system of distribution
of milk used by the dairy because it did not require the employment of
members of the union. The court said that the guarantee of free speech
would be of no avail to the defendant union in regard to future peaceful
picketing, because prior picketing, "was set in a background of violence
.." and because the ".... momentum of fear generated by past violence
would survive even though future picketing might be wholly peaceful."'
States can ".... base protection against future coercion on an inference of
the continuing threat of past misconduct."4
In the case of A.merican Federation of Labor v. Swing' the Supreme
Court, in another opinion by Mr. Justice Frankfurter, ruled that a state
could not, through a common law ruling, require as a prerequisite to
lawful picketing, the relation of employee-employer. This, the court
said was an unwarranted interference with freedom of communication,
which is guaranteed by the Constitution in the first and fourteenth
amendments.
Since the rulings of both of these cases are ultimately based on Fed-
1311 U.S.-, 61 Sup. Ct. 55z, 8S L.Ed. 497, 7 L.R.R. 636 (594i).
furter, refused to set aside an injunction of the Illinois court which
2 Meadowmoor Dairies v. Milk Wagon Drivers Union Etc., 371 Ill. 377, 21 N.E.
(2d) 308 (939).
' 85 L.Ed. Soo, 6z Sup. Ct. 555 ('94').
"Note 3, supra. The court cites but one case to substantiate its holding: Cf. Ethyl
Gasoline Corp. v. United States, 309 U.S. 436, 6o Sup Ct. 6s8, 84 L.Ed. 85z (1940). In
that case illegal control over gasoline jobbers had been maintained by the patentee of a
tetraethyl lead fuid, by the use of a licensing system whereby refiners who were also
licensed by the patentee, were prohibited from selling to unlicensed jobbers. 'The court
said that this monopolistic practice could be suppressed by the state, and that the whole
licensing device might be restrained even though there was a possibility that the system
could be used for some lawful purposes. The reason given was that the state was bound
to take such reasonable measures as would preclude the revival of the former illegal
methods.
5311 U.S.-, 61 Sup. Ct. 568, 85 L.Ed. 513, 7 L.R.R. 643 (94-).
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eral constitutional questions, the state courts will necessarily have to follow
these two decisions.'
The opinion in the Swing case is sufficiently convincing and broadly
stated so that it is safe to draw the conclusion that if picketing is merely
"peaceful persuasion" disentangled from violence and free from "picket-
ing en masse" or otherwise conducted so as to occasion "minimum
aggravated danger" it cannot be enjoined, regardless of what the
common law rule or statute had been in the various states before this
time.
The Ohio rule which would not legalize picketing unless directly
connected with a trade dispute is found in La France Electrical Con-
struction and Suply Co. v. I.B.E.W.' The court in that case held that
a trade dispute existed when employees were striking for reemployment
under conditions which were different from those exacted by the em-
ployer. This rule had been recently expanded somewhat by an opinion
of the Court of Appeals of Fairfield County.' That tribunal held that
picketing was permissible in order to compel a store to observe closing
hours established by the Grocery Clerks' Union and observed by all
other stores in the locality. The court said that such altercation consti-
tuted a valid trade dispute, even though the owners of the store were the
sole workers in the business. These Ohio principles are not now of great
importance, since it will no longer be necessary for the Ohio courts
to follow them, in view of the United States Supreme Court's new
attitude.' The Meadowmoor case takes away much of the liberal effect
which the Swing case might have had in the future. Mr. Justice Frank-
furter declares, ". . . the right of free speech in the future cannot be
forfeited because of disconnected acts of past violence. Nor may a state
enjoin peaceful picketing merely because it may provoke violence in
others."' 0 However, if the state court finds as a fact that the picketing
was enmeshed with violence, and that because the violence cannot be
disassociated from the picketing, the picketing still has a coercive effect,
then the court can enjoin all future picketing. The state may protect
its citizens and corporations from future coercion, and it may use as a
basis of this coercion, the possibility that an inference will be drawn from
the past misconduct, by persons formally coerced, that the violence will
continue in the future."
6 United States v. Reynolds, 22S U.S. 133, 59 L.Ed. 162, 35 Sup. Ct. 86 (1914);
Smith v. Panson, i Ohio 236, 13 Am. Dec. 6o8 (18z).
IxoS Ohio St. 61, 14o N.E. 899 (19z).
'Evans v. Retail Clerks Union, 66 Ohio App. I58, 32 N.E. (zd) Si (194i).
Note 6, supra.
'85 L.Ed. Sox, 6x Sup. Ct. S56 (194).
U Note x, supra.
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It is interesting to note in this regard, however, that the Illinois
Supreme Court did not justify the injunction solely on the ground of
future coercion. In fact, a very small portion of that court's lengthy
decision was devoted to a discussion of this point. Instead, the Illinois
court used as reasons for sustaining the lower court's action the old idea
of "No trade dispute," plus the thought that the right of free speech
cannot be relied upon to the exclusion of the right to engage in business
and to acquire and protect property-both rights having been declared
inherent in the constitution.12
The United States Supreme Court refused to review the facts found
by this Illinois court, and claimed that the duty of the former tribunal
was merely to pass on the question of whether the state had the power
to issue such an injunction. The findings of fact must be accepted by the
United States Supreme Court since it will review the law on appeal.1 "
This conclusion, coupled with the holding of the court in regard to
future coercion, would seem to indicate that if the court applied the
doctrine of the Meadowmoor case narrowly, it would not be too serious a
limitation on peaceful picketing. The inference could very well be that
before the Supreme Court would sustain an injunction against peaceful
picketing (guaranteed by the constitution under the Swing case) it
would require a finding of fact by the state court that future peaceful
picketing would have a coercive and intimidating effect because of former
violence closely related to former picketing.
However, on February io, 194I-the same day that the United
States Supreme Court decided the Meadowmoor case-it denied certi-
orar; in the Ohio case of Crosby v. Rath.14 The Ohio Supreme had
sustained a lower court injunction on the ground that there was no
trade dispute as defined in the La France Case," but the Swing case
decided one day before, erased this requirement from the law. So it
seems that the highest tribunal of the land should have allowed the
appeal. In the findings of the various Ohio Courts that heard the case,
facts of violence appear along with the picketing. There are no findings,
however, that this violence would tend to be coercive in the future, nor
is it shown that if peaceful picketing were allowed, the fear of violence
would be prevalent. The logical conclusion is that any injunction
against future peaceful picketing will be sustained if violence occured
22 Note 2, supra.
"'Note io, supra.
"Rath v. Crosby, 6z S. Ct. 618, 85 L.Ed. S54 (19P); Crosby v. Rath, 136 Ohio
St. 3521 7S N.E. (2d) 934 (1940). See note, "Limitations on th eDefinition. on a Trade
Dispute."-Piketing as an Exercise of Free Speech, 6 Ono ST. L. J. 334-
' Note 7, supra.
before the injunction issued. So it seems that the United States Supreme
Court does not narrowly interpret its decision in the Meadowmoor case.
While the standard of how much violence is necessary should be that
set out in the Meadowmoor case-namely, was it coercive- the fact
that the court refused to hear the Crosby case would seem to indicate
that there is no standard at all. The mere finding of violence associated
with the picketing is evidently enough to justify the issuance of an injunc-
tion to stop all further picketing.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter blandly told the defendant in the Meadow-
moor case that it might ask the Illinois court to modify or vacate the
injunction when the violence no longer had any intimidating effect. 6
This is some concession to the union in that case, but what about the
union in the Crosby case? There had been no findings that future
peaceful picketing would be coercive. Can the defendant go to court
and demand that the injunction be vacated on the ground that there
never was such a finding? This question is left unanswered by the
decisions thus far. R.C.C.
PLEADING AND PROCEDURE
APPEAL-NOTICE OF APPEAL-SUFFICIENCY AND AMEND-
MENT OF NOTICE
In an action in equity a decree was entered January 3, 194o. A
motion for new trial, filed the same day, was overruled February 9, the
entry fixing the amount of bond to be furnished by plaintiff-appellant
upon appeal on questions of law and fact. Within twenty days there-
after plaintiff-appellant gave "notice of her intention to Appeal to the
Court of Appeals from a final order made in the Court of Common
Pleas in the above entitled cause on the 9 th day of February, 1940.... "
The Court of Appeals on its own motion dismissed the appeal because
the notice of appeal was defective in that it specified the order over-
ruling the motion for new trial, which is not a final order, instead of
the prior appealable decree. An application for rehearing and a motion
for leave to amend the notice were denied on the ground that the
Court of Appeals has no authority to permit such amendment. This
decision was reaffirmed on a second application for rehearing. From
an entry dismissing the appeal and denying the application for rehear-
ing and for leave to amend, a motion to certify was granted. Held,
(By the Court) that, since the court of appeals has power to make
'I 85 L.Ed. .66, 6x Sup. Ct. 51o (194I).
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